Serious Games Summit '06 Part II

Is the Department of Defense Serious About Games?
Part II of Manifesto Games’ Serious Games Summit Coverage

by Johnny L. Wilson

In 1976, an officer on the USS McKean (DD-784) began running a series of games aboard ship built off a game called NAVTAG. NAVTAG was an official U.S. Navy game that used classified data. This was good because it provided “validated” data and algorithms so that participants did not receive “bad” information, but it was bad because there could only be one copy of the game per ship and that game had to be locked away with other classified data when not in use. This limited the possibilities for using the game for ongoing training. To remedy this, the officer began working on his own set of rules, using realistic but non-classified data. In 1980, that rules set became the Harpoon game of naval miniatures rules. That officer, Larry Bond, became a best-selling author.

Yet, to this day, there are significant difficulties in getting useful games into the hands of the military and using them effectively. This portion of the report will cover the general problems, as delineated in one session, and the use of Harpoon as delineated in another.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: After several successful missions, the U.S. Department of Defense is still undecided about the ultimate efficacy of Harpoon.

When Worlds Collide (DoD and the PC)

Bob Bates, formerly CEO of Legend Entertainment (an entertainment company with majority ownership belonging to a defense contractor), and Brian Williams of the Institute of Defense Analyses (a major think tank) have been working on a report for the defense establishment. Though they could not present actual data from that report at the conference, they did share some of their personal observations gleaned from collecting such data. The following is a presentation of those personal observations that we found relevant.

Hundreds of academic studies have proved that games are effective in terms of learning and training. Yet, there is no clearing house for providing this information to prospective purchasers within the defense establishment.

Games are not a panacea for every training problem. Yet, some advocates act as if they are. Both game developers as vendors and government agencies as purchasers need rigor in terms of methodology and both sides need to be willing to pay for it. Unfortunately, at the present time, it appears that game developers are more willing to pay more for graphics than for verification, validation, and evaluation [that protection from “bad” information we mentioned in the introductory anecdote about Harpoon].

Gaming is at the threshold of turning into a real media. Being part of real media has the good news flavor of making a medium more acceptable and accessible to everyone. Yet, this is one of the discomforts at DoD. If media is participatory, that provides a potential for exposure for one’s own systems. This is dangerous.

Legal issues make it impossible for buyers to meet sellers and for the governmental/defense contractor institutions to share information as a community. As a result, it is hard for those seeking game developers to find the right developers for a given project and it is hard for developers to learn about potential jobs, contact the right agencies, or complete contracting vehicles. Something needs to be done to provide for a competitive marketplace beyond the traditional restrictions of defense contracting.

Game companies typically don’t know about www.fedbizopps.gov nor tracking RFPs, BAAs, MURIs, SBIRs, STTRs in order to get through the maze of government contracting regulations. The contracting cycle itself is too resource-intensive and lengthy for most small developers.

Most contracting officers often have to arrange for acquisition and development of games by “creatively circumventing” the current acquisition apparatus.

Development culture within large, cost-plus-oriented prime contractors is different from that of small game developers. Game industry has settled on agile development as the most effective way to create innovative and fun projects. This involves little prototypes, rapid iteration, and many cycles.

When government project managers fund this type of development, it must be funded as research. This means it comes from a different pocket than the money assigned to training.

Finally, governmental standards requirements are a roadblock to rapid and effective implementation of serious games. Whenever government mandates interoperability, it slows process and levels quality. Industry R&D standards are ahead of the government process by years. This means that the costs of creating the standards are no longer worth it.

The takeaway was that DoD needs to embrace the medium, acknowledge its validity, use it, invest in it, and challenge it to reach its potential as a medium.

Harpoon

Now, in the light of these observations, consider the checkered history of Harpoon. Designed as a training tool by a naval officer, it has had to be used “under the radar” for most of its existence. Though many Surface Warfare Officers have found it to be an invaluable training tool, the U.S. Navy spends the bulk of its time on its own systems. Any officers who want to utilize this tool are forced to learn it on their own time. There is even a sense among many that it is unprofessional to game on a PC, even for training.

The Australian Department of Defense has taken a more positive approach, calling Harpoon 3 Professional a low-fidelity simulation and analysis tool. Unlike the high-fidelity approach insisted upon in the U.S., the Australian DoD believes that the lightweight model allows:
1. The analyst to make more passes at the problem space in an operational/tactical level;
2. Provides for rapid and direct application of analyst skills to a broader set of scenarios without exhausting vast computational resources;
3. Features a significant reduction in the setup time over the high-fidelity model;
4. Allows for multiplayer involvement—hence expanding training efficacy;
5. Validates at the macro level, the logic and tactical employment options as reconsideration of seminar wargames; and
6. Explores, at the macro level, potential tactical employment of current and future groups, platforms, and weapons mixes.

The good news for gamers is that these applications provide for the survival and development of the game. We know Harpoon will be around in the future and will become even more sophisticated and, hopefully, interesting. The bad news for the U.S. citizen is that it doesn’t look like our own defense complex is quite as tuned into the possibilities of gaming as those defense establishments outside our shores.